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The Firearm-Disability Dilemma: Property
Insights into Felon Gun Rights
Frederick C. Bensont
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, Leroy Miller took Ricky Fines onto his northern Indiana farm as a boarder? Due to Miller and Fines's mutual interest in guns, the pair began purchasing, refurbishing, and selling firearms as business associates. After three years of
uneventful gun refurbishment, federal agents executed a search
warrant at the farm in April 2004. The agents discovered and
seized three weapons in Miller's home and thirty-one located in
a nearby shed, all purportedly belonging to Miller. Absent any
aggravating circumstances, Miller's constructive possession of
these thirty-four firearms would have been completely legal and
unsuspicious. Unfortunately for Miller, Fines was a convicted
felon, and Miller knew it.
Under federal law, it is a felony offense for convicted felons
to possess firearms,2 and for others-such as Miller-to knowingly aid and abet felons in firearm possession.3 Both Fines and
Miller were convicted of federal felonies, and Miller's new status
as a felon prospectively subjected him to the same firearm possession ban that precipitated his predicament.4 Although the law
prohibits only the possession of firearms and not their ownership,5 the government had the statutory right to completely extinguish Miller's firearm-ownership rights by instituting forfeiture
t BA 2010, Brigham Young University; JD Candidate 2014, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 Miller v United States, 2010 WL 1506546, *1 (ND Ind).
2 See 18 USC § 922(g)(1).
3 18 USC § 2(a).
4 See United States v Miller, 547 F3d 718, 719 (7th Cir 2008).
5 See 18 USC § 922(g)(1). Property ownership is distinct from property possession.
For example, in a bailment relationship, a bailee possesses property owned by a bailor.
See Bailments, 8 Corpus Juris Secundum § 1 at 365-67 (West 2005).
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proceedings within 120 days of the seizure.* However, the government failed to timely commence such proceedings against
Miller, thereby nullifying the forfeiture authority granted by
Congress.7
When congressionally granted forfeiture authority is not exercised, the default rule is that "seized property, other than contraband, should be returned to its rightful owner."e Because returning the seized firearms would violate the federal possession
ban, the government refused to relinquish Miller's guns upon his
request. 9 Thus, the government's failure to properly pursue forfeiture proceedings against Miller consigned his thirty-four firearms to judicial limbo: Miller's firearm property rights had not
been extinguished by forfeiture proceedings, but the firearms
could not be returned to Miller due to his "firearm disability."o
This Comment addresses the contradiction in federal law
that produces this seemingly irreconcilable predicament. How
can courts resolve the statutory inconsistencies that generate a
"firearm-disability dilemma"? More specifically, does the felon
firearm possession ban effectively extinguish all firearm property rights, and if not, what are the contours of any residual property rights? Part I explores the statutory background that generates this legal quandary. This background includes an inquiry
into antecedent legal issues that provide context and guidance
for understanding the firearm-disability dilemma, including indepth analyses of the meaning of possession, the differences between derivative and per se contraband, and the potential for a
Fifth Amendment taking claim. Part II outlines the firearmdisability dilemma case law, describing the ways in which courts
have previously resolved this problem. The courts are divided
between recognizing a residual right and refusing to do so.
In Part III, the Comment presents three different judicial
tools that courts historically employ when forced to conceptualize and adjudicate uncertain property rights: substantive, formalistic, and moralistic conceptions of property. Part IV applies
these judicial tools to the firearm-disability dilemma. It observes
that all of the courts to confront the firearm-disability dilemma
See 18 USC § 924(d)(1).
United States v Miller, 588 F3d 418, 418-19 (7th Cir 2009).
8 United States v LaFatch,565 F2d 81, 83 (6th Cir 1977).
Miller, 588 F3d at 419 (summarizing the arguments in Miller's postconviction
lawsuit to regain possession of his firearms).
10 See note 15 and accompanying text.
6

7
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have implicitly employed at least one of these conceptions of
property, and that the particular conception embraced by a given court largely determines the type of remedy ultimately fashioned. Part IV then proposes a constructive trust and power of
appointment remedy that attempts to utilize the advantages of
each property conceptualization, while avoiding their inherent
drawbacks. The Comment concludes that courts faced with a
firearm-disability dilemma will have an easier time reconciling
the inconsistent treatment of uncertain property rights if they
are aware of the varying property conceptualizations behind the
rulings.
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

The firearm-disability dilemma is the product of a confluence of statutes and legal doctrines that contradict one another
under certain circumstances. This Part seeks to illuminate the
issue by first exploring the conflicting statutory framework, and
then addressing three antecedent legal issues that provide a
foundation for understanding the dilemma.
Statutory Ambiguity at the Intersection of 18 USC §§ 922
and 924

A.

In 1968, Congress sought to remedy the "high incidence of
crime in the United States" by passing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196811 ("Crime Control Act"). In order to achieve its stated goal of "strengthening and improving
law enforcement at every level,"12 the Crime Control Act included provisions that regulate the possession of firearms by convicted felons.13 As currently amended, these provisions stipulate:
"It shall be unlawful for any person [ ] who has been convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ...

to ship or transport ... or possess ...

any

firearm or ammunition."14 Courts describe this provision as a
Pub L No 90-351, 82 Stat 197.
Crime Control Act, 82 Stat at 198.
13 Crime Control Act Title IV, 82 Stat at 225-35.
14 18 USC § 922(g). Note that all crimes punishable by a term exceeding one year
are classified as felonies. See 18 USC § 3559(a). It is also important to note that, in addition to convicted felons, the statute subjects several other classes of individuals to firearms disabilities, including fugitives from justice, unlawful users of controlled substances, persons adjudicated as mentally defective, illegal aliens, aliens admitted to the
United States under nonimmigrant visas, persons dishonorably discharged from the
Armed Forces, individuals who have renounced US citizenship, certain persons subject
11

12
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"firearm disability" that attaches to felons upon conviction.15 Individuals may receive relief from the firearm disability by petition,16 pardon,17 acquittal, or dismissal of the charges,5 but absent these rare exceptions, the disability is extinguished only by
the felon's death.19
. In conjunction with prohibiting felon firearm possession,
Congress also addressed the disposition of firearms found in the
possession of convicted felons. Under the original Crime Control
Act, the legislature stated: "Any firearm or ammunition involved
in, or used or intended to be used in, any violation of the provisions of this chapter ... shall be subject to seizure and forfei-

A felony conviction thus imposes a lifetime ban on firearm possession in addition to the possibility that significant
investments in firearm property will be forfeited.
Several years after the Crime Control Act's implementation,
members of Congress became concerned about the manner in
which the possession ban was being enforced. Congress was uneasy with Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF) practices of enticing gun collectors to violate firearm regulations and subsequently seizing valuable gun collections.21 Accordingly, it enacted the Firearm Owners' Protection Act22
(FOPA) in an attempt to "reaffirm [that] the intent of the Congress" in passing the Gun Control Act of 196823 was not to "place
any undue or unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on
law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or
use of firearms."24 Particularly germane to the firearm-disability
ture."20

to restraining orders, and individuals who have been convicted of misdemeanor crimes of
domestic violence. 18 USC § 922(g)(2)-(9).
15 See, for example, Johnson v United States, 130 S Ct 1265, 1273 (2010).
16 See 18 USC § 925(c).
17 See 18 USC § 921(a)(20); United States v Miller, 588 F3d 418, 420 (7th Cir 2009)
(stating that a pardon will end a firearm disability).
1 See 18 USC § 924(d)(1).
19 See Mark M. Stavsky, No Guns or Butter for Thomas Bean: FirearmsDisabilities
and Their Occupational Consequences, 30 Fordham Urban L J 1759, 1768-75 (2003) (exploring the disability relief provision and describing public outcry against expenditures
for enforcing the provision, which ultimately resulted in Congress's refusal to fund relief
investigations).
20 Crime Control Act § 924(c), ch 44, 82 Stat at 233.
21 See S 49, 99th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 3, 1985), in 131 Cong Rec 18155 (July 9, 1985)
(describing the ATF practice of prosecuting individuals and subjecting their gun collections to § 924 forfeiture after first encouraging them to act as unlicensed firearm
dealers).
22 Pub L No 99-308, 100 Stat 449 (1986).
23 Pub L No 90-618, 82 Stat 1213.
24 FOPA § 1(b)(2), 100 Stat at 449.
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dilemma is the added provision that "[any action or proceeding
for the forfeiture of firearms or ammunition shall be commenced
within one hundred and twenty days of such seizure."25 The legislative history surrounding this limitations period clearly indicates that it was intended to be strictly construed, such that
"[b]eyond this point the statutory power to forfeit is lost."2e
In combination, these two provisions prohibit convicted felons from possessing firearms, while simultaneously precluding
the government from instituting forfeiture proceedings against
seized weaponry after the 120-day limitations period. The legal
ambiguity that arises from this construction is readily apparent:
What should a judge do when the government fails to timely institute 18 USC § 924 forfeiture proceedings against a convicted
felon that is subject to 18 USC § 922's firearm disability?
B. Antecedent Legal Issues
In order to understand the firearm-disability dilemma, it is
important to address three antecedent legal issues. First, an examination of how courts interpret "possession" helps determine
the extent to which a firearm disability inhibits felons vis-A-vis
firearm property. This issue also informs a court's conceptualization of the fuzzy property rights at issue in the firearmdisability dilemma context, as will be explored in Part IV. Second, an understanding of the distinction courts draw between
derivative and per se contraband is critical to determining when
felon firearm possession implicates the firearm-disability dilemma. Finally, an assessment of whether the firearm-disability
dilemma constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking is also warranted because at least two courts have considered the question. The
potential for a takings claim also influences the remedies explored and proposed in Part IV and must thus be investigated
prior to a discussion of residual property rights.
1. What is "possession"?
If possession constitutes nine-tenths of the law, then what
constitutes possession, and what remains of an otherwise complete property right if possession is proscribed? In order to understand how a firearm disability affects a felon's residual
FOPA § 104, 100 Stat at 457, codified at 18 USC § 924(d)(1).
See David T. Hardy, The FirearmsOwners'ProtectionAct: A Historicaland Legal
Perspective, 17 Cumb L Rev 585, 660 & n 407 (1987).
25
26
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property rights, it is critical to understand how courts interpret
the term "possession" within the context of § 922.27 Although this
question generates a great deal of attention in property law,28
criminal law avoids resorting to theoretical explications on the
meaning of possession. Instead, courts simply describe possession as either physical or constructive, with relatively clear definitions for each.
Physical possession is a straightforward concept. Physical
possession of property consists of "actual physical control" of the
item in question.29 For example, in United States v White,0 the
court ruled that a defendant was in physical possession of a firearm when police found him sitting on a bed and "holding a
sawed-off shotgun by the trigger area with his right hand while
he loaded a round into the magazine tube with his left."3' Such
firearm possession is clearly anticipated and prohibited by
§ 922's possession ban.
Constructive possession, while more nuanced than physical
possession, is still relatively easy to define. The Seventh Circuit
ruled that "[c]onstructive possession exists when a person knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise
dominion and control over an object, either directly, or through
others."32 In United States v Caldwell,33 the court determined
that owning and residing in a home that contains firearms
27 See 18 USC § 922(g).
28 See Carol M. Rose, Possessionas the Origin of Property, 52 U Chi L Rev 73, 7475 (1985) (exploring the scope and nature of the right of possession in property law with
a focus on the common law maxim that "first possession is the root of title'); Richard A.
Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 Ga L Rev 1221, 1221-22 (1979) (using the
principle of possession in an attempt to clarify the contours of "ownership rights). See
also Alexandra B. Mass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional
Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U Colo L Rev 283, 283 (2006) (utilizing traditional notions of possession in the conservation context).
29 State v Fries, 185 P3d 453, 456 (Or 2008).
30 552 F3d 240 (2d Cir 2009).
31 Id at 243.
32 United States v Caldwell, 423 F3d 754, 758 (7th Cir 2005). See also United States
v Thomas, 321 F3d 627, 636 (7th Cir 2003) ("[D]efendants are in constructive possession
if they have 'the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.'"); United States v Payton, 159 F3d
49, 56 (2d Cir 1998) ("Constructive possession exists when a person has the power and
intention to exercise dominion and control over an object."); United States v Woodall, 938
F2d 834, 838 (8th Cir 1991) ("An individual is said to have constructive possession over
contraband if he [or she] had 'ownership, dominion or control over the contraband itself,
or dominion over the premises in which the contraband is concealed."') (alterations in
original). See also Weapons, 94 Corpus Juris Secundum § 10 at 580-82 (West 2001) (explaining constructive possession of weapons).
33 423 F3d 754 (7th Cir 2005).
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amounts to constructive possession of the firearms.3 Similarly, a
district court in Iowa held that the act of making a "'complete'
gift" of firearms to another constituted constructive possession of
the weapons, since the defendant's designation of "his sister as
the recipient of the Firearms would require him to exercise 'dominion' or 'control' over the Firearms because he would be deciding where they ought to go and who ought to possess them.".3
Though several courts disagree with the Northern District of
Iowa's conclusion that making a complete gift amounts to constructive possession,36 the cases nevertheless demonstrate that
constructive possession usually implicates a degree of control or
dominion over property.
These definitions establish what actions § 922 prohibits, and
are therefore useful in determining which, if any, residual property rights persist after the right of possession is excised from an
otherwise complete title to chattel property. 7 For now, it is important to note that § 922 prohibits both (1) physical possession
of firearms and (2) control of firearms that rises to the level of
constructive possession.
2. Are firearms derivative or per se contraband?
In the absence of forfeiture proceedings such as § 924, "[t]he
general rule is that seized property, other than contraband,
should be returned to its rightful owner" after termination of the
criminal proceedings associated with the seizure.38 Under this
rule, courts must classify contraband as either "derivative" or
"per se." Derivative contraband is generally returned to the defendant, while per se contraband is not. In other words, this rule
preserves derivative contraband property rights, while effecting
the complete termination of property rights in per se contraband. This distinction merits an assessment of each type of contraband to determine the scope of the firearm-disability dilemma. The dilemma, after all, does not arise when contraband is
classified as per se: there can be no question of residual property

34 Id at 758.
35 United States v Oleson, 2008 WL 2945458, *2 (ND Iowa).
36 See Miller, 588 F3d at 419-20 (suggesting that making a gift of firearms would
resolve the firearm-disability dilemma); United States v Parsons, 472 F Supp 2d 1169,
1176-77 (ND Iowa 2007). See also United States v Rodriguez, 2011 WL 5854369, *7 (WD
Tex) (considering the propriety of allowing the defendant to gift his firearms).
37 For a detailed examination of this issue, see Part IV.
8 United States v LaFatch,565 F2d 81, 83 (6th Cir 1977).
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rights in per se contraband because there are no legitimate
property rights in chattels so categorized.
Per se contraband is chattel property that subjects possessors to criminal liability regardless of how it is used.89 United
States v Jeffers,40 in which the defendant claimed a property interest in seized illegal narcotics, demonstrates this principle.41
In light of Congress's express declaration that "no property
rights shall exist" in narcotics contraband, the Supreme Court
refused to recognize a property right in banned narcotics that
would require their return to the defendant.42 Similarly, the
Court refused to remit illegal alcoholic goods and distilling
equipment to the defendants in Trupiano v United States," reasoning that, "since this property was contraband, they have no
right to have it returned to them."" Both of these cases "concerned objects the possession of which, without more, constitutes
a crime."45
Conversely, derivative contraband is not inherently unlawful, but may become so if put to an unlawful use as an instrumentality of crime.46 For example, in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
v Pennsylvania47 the Supreme Court held that an automobile
used to transport liquor without state tax seals was derivative
contraband due to the illegal use to which the vehicle was put.48
On the question of forfeiture, the DC Circuit in United States v
Farrell49 stated that there was "no precedent for confiscation
without statutory authority . . . of derivative contraband merely
See Black's Law Dictionary 365 (West 9th ed 2009).
342 US 48 (1951).
41 Id at 54.
42 Id at 52-54 (holding that "the respondent was not entitled to have [per se contraband] returned to him," but also recognizing a limited property right solely "for the
purposes of the exclusionary rule" under the Fourth Amendment, such that illegally
seized contraband evidence should be suppressed at trial).
43 334 US 699 (1948).
44 Id at 710.
45 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v Pennsylvania, 380 US 693, 699 (1965) (explaining
that "[t]he return of [per se] contraband would clearly have frustrated the express public
policy against the possession of such objects"). See also Cooper v City of Greenwood, Mississippi, 904 F2d 302, 305 (5th Cir 1990) ("Courts will not entertain a claim contesting
the confiscation of contraband per se because one cannot have a property right in that
which is not subject to legal possession.").
46 Cooper, 904 F2d at 305. See also United States v Farrell,606 F2d 1341, 1344 (DC
Cir 1979).
47 380 US 693 (1965).
48 Id at 699 (deeming an automobile derivative contraband when it was used to illegally transport liquor without state tax seals).
49 606 F2d 1341 (DC Cir 1979).
39

40
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because it is derivative contraband."50 Therefore, derivative contraband that falls outside the scope of congressional forfeiture
provisions is subject to the default rule and should be returned
to its rightful owner after the termination of criminal proceedings.5l
Courts apply the contraband framework in two ways to firearms implicated by a § 922 disability. Some courts hold strictly
to the notion that contraband qualifies as per se only when mere
possession is actionable.52 For these courts, the requirement of a
felony conviction prior to the attachment of a firearm disability
moves firearm property outside the scope of per se contraband.
In other words, mere possession is not sufficient for liability to
attach, but must be coupled with the aggravating circumstance
of a felony conviction.53 Under this view, firearms that are not
prohibited outright are always considered derivative contraband.54
Other courts place no special emphasis on the requirement
that a person must first be convicted of a felony before the mere
possession of firearms is prohibited. For these courts, the timing
of the felon's conviction will determine whether disputed firearm
property is per se or derivative contraband.r* Because § 922 precludes mere possession of firearms by felons, these courts reason
that firearms acquired by someone after a felony conviction fall
into the category of per se contraband, while those obtained before a felony conviction are properly characterized as derivative
contraband, provided their initial possession was legal. Put differently, a felony conviction prospectively renders all otherwise
legal weapons later acquired by felons per se contraband.56
Id at 1344.
51 LaFatch, 565 F2d at 83.
52 See Cooper, 904 F2d at 304-05 (asking whether "a firearm in the possession of a
felon [is] more akin to [illegal narcotics] or to an automobile used in a bank robbery," and
holding that the required ancillary condition of felony status moves firearms into the automobile category). See also 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 US at 699; Farrell, 606 F2d at
1344.
53 See Cooper, 904 F2d at 305 ("In Cooper's case, the 'something more' is Cooper's
membership in a category of persons prohibited from possessing firearms.).
54 See id. See also Rodriguez, 2011 WL 5854369 at *6 ("[A] firearm not of the type
[explicitly] proscribed ... is not contraband per se, and [felons have] a constitutionally
protected property interest-limited to ownership interest and stripped of any possesso.
ry interest-in such a firearm.").
55 See United States v Felici, 208 F3d 667, 670 (8th Cir 2000) (strictly construing
the possession ban, but noting that this construction is "[b]ased upon Felici's status as a
convicted felon"); Parsons,472 F Supp 2d at 1174 (noting that had the defendant been a
felon when law enforcement confiscated his firearms, his motion for a return of seized
property would have been denied).
56 These courts reason that ruling otherwise would "clearly [] frustrate[] the express public policy against the possession of such objects." Farrell,606 F2d at 1344.
50

The University of Chicago Law Review

1240

[80:1231

Consequently, the scope of the firearm-disability dilemma is
dependent upon a court's construction of the per se and derivative contraband question, as only derivative contraband-which
but for § 922 would be subject to the default rule requiring its
return-triggers the issue. In jurisdictions where the first approach is adopted, the dilemma encompasses all firearm property not subject to an absolute ban.67 For courts accepting the second approach, the firearm-disability dilemma is limited to
firearms legally owned by felons prior to their convictions. Both
approaches require the expiration of a 120-day limitations period under § 924's forfeiture proceedings for the dilemma to arise.
Accordingly, while a court's construction of the contraband issue
determines the scope of the firearm-disability dilemma, it ultimately does not resolve the question.
3. The firearm-disability dilemma as an unconstitutional
taking?
Although the Supreme Court ruled that the Second
Amendment secures to individuals the right to keep and bear
arms, it also acknowledged the right's limits, asserting that
their decision should not cast doubt on the constitutionality of
the felony firearm disability.5 The Court has also held that the
firearm disability does not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.5@ However, the Court has not entertained a challenge to the firearm-disability dilemma under
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Two other courts have
considered whether the dilemma works an uncompensated taking. The attention this question has attracted in the case law
merits a brief overview of the takings issue to ensure that any
broad constitutional concerns the dilemma raises are addressed
prior to a focused assessment of residual property rights. Additionally, the possibility that some remedies to the firearmdisability dilemma may constitute uncompensated takings is a
pertinent consideration for courts fashioning their rulings. Part
IV further discusses the relevance of this takings inquiry to potential solutions to the disability dilemma.
57 For example, machine guns constitute per se contraband under either approach,
as they are completely prohibited by 18 USC § 922(o).
58 District of Columbia v Heller, 128 S Ct 2783, 2816-17 (2008) (emphasizing that
the Court's opinion should not be construed to cast doubt on "prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill").
59 Lewis v United States, 445 US 55, 65-6 (1980).
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In United States v Zaleski,60 the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut held that the firearmdisability dilemma does not implicate the Takings Clause.61 The
court stated that the "Takings Clause is designed to prevent the
government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."62 The court concluded that the dilemma does
not violate this policy because convicted felons must bear these
deprivations alone due to their criminal mischief.63 In contrast,
Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has implied
that the failure to recognize any residual property right in the
firearm-disability dilemma does constitute a Fifth Amendment
taking.64 The divergence between these two views demonstrates
the ambiguous nature of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence in the context of the firearm-disability dilemma.
The firearm-disability dilemma might be characterized as a
taking by application of the per se rule that "permanent physical
occupation[s]" are always takings.65 The DC Circuit first applied
this per se rule to chattel property in Nixon v United States.66 A
statute that extinguished rights of possession and control, established uncertain rights of access, limited the right to exclude,
and abolished the ability to dispose of regulated property was
held to be a per se Fifth Amendment taking of former President
Richard Nixon's presidential papers. 67 The court noted that the
relevant inquiries for importing the per se test into the chattel
property context include (1) whether the residual rights "preserve for the former owner the essential economic use of the surrendered property" and (2) whether the right to exclude others
from using the property has been completely extinguished.68
60 2011 WL 1559238 (D Conn), vacd and remd on other grounds by United States v
Zaleski, 686 F3d 90 (2d Cir 2012).
61 Zaleski, 2011 WL 1559238 at *3.
62 Id (quotation marks omitted).
63 Id.
64 Miller, 588 F3d at 419 (implying that the government's failure to remedy this
situation would result in an extra round of Tucker Act takings litigation to determine
the value of the firearms if they were destroyed by the government).
65 Loretto u Teleprompter ManhattanCATV Corp, 458 US 419, 426 (1982).
66 978 F2d 1269 (DC Cir 1992).
67 Id at 1287.
68 Id at 1285-87. It is worth noting that the subsidiary questions posed in Nixon for
the Loretto framework bear a strong resemblance to the per se test the Court adopted
five months earlier in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1019
(1992). In Lucas, the critical takings inquiry was whether all economically beneficial uses of a parcel of real property had been proscribed by the challenged regulation. See id.
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Thus, the application of this narrowly construed per se test to a
firearm-disability dilemma depends upon a factual assessment
of the remedy a court prescribes.69 Court rulings that completely
reject any claim to residual property rights in firearm property
appear to trigger this per se test because they do not preserve
the economic value of firearms or any rights of exclusion for felons. Contrarily, holdings that preserve certain rights-such as
the right to determine who ultimately receives the property and
the right to the property's economic value-seem to mitigate the
two inquiries undertaken in Nixon. It is also notable that the
ability to relieve the disability by pardon, petition, acquittal, or
dismissal of the charges may also remove the possession ban
from the narrow scope of this per se test, since it is arguably not
a "permanent" deprivation of property if it can be terminated.70
If not subject to per se takings jurisprudence, remedies to
the firearm-disability dilemma may still be deemed takings pursuant to an "in-depth factual inquiry to determine whether one's
economic interests have been sufficiently damaged as to warrant
compensation."71 The Supreme Court first applied the "ad hoc,
factual inquir[y]"72 developed in Penn Central TransportationCo

v New York City7' to chattel property in Andrus v Allard.74
There, the Court held that a federal statute prohibiting the
commercial sale of eagle feathers did not constitute a Fifth
Amendment taking.7r Noting that the Takings Clause "preserves
governmental power to regulate, subject only to the dictates of
justice and fairness,"76 the Court denied the takings claim by relying upon the fact that, out of the full bundle of property
rights,77 the legislation extinguished only the right of property
alienation.78
This rule is not easily applied outside of the real property context. However, the Nixon
court's contemporaneous concern with economic use does suggest that per se takings jurisprudence evolved in 1992 to place a greater emphasis on economic use generally.
69 See Nixon, 978 F2d at 1284 (noting that "the holding of Loretto is a narrow one").
70 See notes 16-18 and accompanying text. See also Arkansas Game and Fish
Commission v United States, 133 S Ct 511, 521 (2012) (reaffirming the narrow scope of
Loretto, which excludes nonpermanent invasions of property).
71 Nixon, 978 F2d at 1284.
72 Penn Central TransportationCo v New York City, 438 US 104, 124 (1978).
73 438 US 104 (1978).
74 444 US 51, 65 (1979).
75 Id at 67-68.
76 Id at 65 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Penn Central,438 US at 124.
77 Legal realists conceptualize property as a "very complex [bundle] of rights, privileges, powers and immunities." Walter W. Cook, Introduction:Hohfeld's Contributions to
the Science of Law, in Walter Wheeler Cook, ed, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental
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In many ways, a court recognizing residual property rights
in the firearm-disability dilemma is faced with a situation similar to that presented in Allard. The Crime Control Act removes
possession rights from the full bundle of property rights owners
normally have in their firearms, while the statute in Allard
terminated the right to derive economic value from the sale of
eagle feathers. To be sure, the right to possess and the right to
economic value are distinct.79 But, as the Court observed, "At
least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights,
the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."80 This language suggests that judicial recognition of residual firearm
property rights should weaken the persuasiveness of takings
challenges to the firearm-disability dilemma.
Two final doctrines that may remove the firearm possession
ban from Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence are the per se
nuisance abatement and forfeiture exceptions. When property is
used "in the commission of a crime or a public nuisance," government regulations that abate such usage-thereby promoting
the "health, morals, or safety of the community"81--are exempted from the requirement to pay just compensation for appropriated property. 82 This is because the police power, which justifies
both the nuisance abatement and forfeiture exceptions,83 "cannot
be [ I burdened with the condition that the state must compensate such individual owners ... by reason of their not being

permitted ... to inflict injury upon the community."84 In light of
Congress's stated goals of limiting "the ease with which any person can acquire firearms" in order to decrease "the prevalence of
lawlessness and violent crime in the United States,"85 the
Legal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning and Other Legal Essays 3, 14 (1923).
For a more extended discussion on the "bundles" theory of property, see Part III.A.
78 Allard, 444 US at 65-66.
79 Id at 66 (noting that it was critical that the statute left intact the right of
possession).
80 Id at 6-66.

81 Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623, 668-69 (1887).
82 David A. Dana and Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 110-16 (Foundation
Press 2002).
83 See id at 110 (noting that the Court has created several categorical exceptions
where compensation is never required due to the justification of being "pure police power
regulation").
84 Mugler, 123 US at 669.
85 Crime Control Act § 901, 82 Stat at 225-26 (citing causal relationships between
firearm accessibility, youthful criminality, and general lawlessness as further justification for the legislation). Additionally, Congress's purpose in passing the Crime Control
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possession ban would seem fully within the scope of the police
power exception. However, the Court has also held that the "police power" is reserved exclusively to the states, which is problematic because the firearm-disability dilemma stems from federal statutes.86 Additionally, the forfeiture exemption requires
statutory authority for the expropriation of property, which is
absent when the government exceeds § 924's 120-day limitations
period.87 It is thus unclear in the firearm-disability context
whether these police power exceptions would save from the Takings Clause a remedy that failed to recognize any residual property rights.a8
Regardless of the police power exceptions' applicability, the
character of the government action in the dilemma contextwhich is geared towards preserving community safety-would
undoubtedly support a more favorable result to the government
under the Penn Central balancing inquiry utilized in Allard.*
This is because government actions that seek to "promote the
common good" are less likely to be considered takings.o Note,
however, that a court must protect some residual firearm property rights to get past the per se analysis, which otherwise may
moot this point by precluding a Penn Central balancing inquiry
altogether.
In summary, remedies to the firearm-disability dilemma
that do not recognize residual property rights are probably per
se takings, since no rights to economic value or exclusion remain,
Act was to "prevent crime and to insure the greater safety of the people." Crime Control
Act, 82 Stat at 197.
86 United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 618 (2000). See also D. Benjamin Barros,
The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U Miami L Rev 471, 495 n 126 (2004) (exploring the concept of "police power" and asserting that the federal government does not
enjoy a police power).
87 See Bennis v Michigan, 516 US 442, 452-53 (1996) (asserting that because the
"State [] sought to deter illegal activity that contributes to ... unsafe streets," the forfeiture statute was valid, and compliance with its requirements did not work an uncompensated taking). See also Dana and Merrill, Takings at 115 (cited in note 82) ("The Court
has held that as long as the forfeiture proceeding satisfies statutory and due process requirements, it does not raise any question under the Takings Clause").
88 Regarding the question of whether the federal government enjoys a police power
similar to that possessed by the states, compare Barros, 58 U Miami L Rev at 495-96
(cited in note 86) (stating that there is no federal police power), with Richard A. Epstein,
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 107-08 (Harvard 1985)
(noting that the Constitution should be construed to allow "both the federal and state
governments the minimum capacity to maintain peace and good order" because "the police power remains an inherent attribute of sovereignty at all levels of government").
89 See Allard, 444 US at 65-67.
90 Penn Central, 438 US at 124.
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as required under Nixon.91 This is likely what led Judge Easterbrook to suggest that the failure to protect a residual property
interest would provide grounds for a subsequent takings challenge.92 Holdings that extinguish all firearm property rights are
questionable even under the Allard balancing inquiry, which also turned on the retention of certain rights. Therefore, at least
in light of the Fifth Amendment, the most pragmatic resolutions
of the firearm-disability dilemma recognize a residual property
right in some form, thereby significantly obviating takings concerns. 98
II. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE FIREARM-DISABILITY
DILEMMA
The statutory contradictions that generate the firearmdisability dilemma do not lend themselves to easy solutions and
have consequently generated a significant amount of litigation.
This predicament produced a circuit split, with some courts recognizing a residual property right in firearms for those subjected
to the firearm-disability dilemma and others refusing to do so.
This Part details both sides of the circuit split, categorizing
courts that preserve residual firearm property rights as "formalistic" or "realist," while also exploring the "moralistic" approach
employed by courts rejecting felons' claims.
A. Formalistic and Realist Approaches Recognizing Residual
Property Rights
Courts recognizing residual property rights at the intersection of §§ 922 and 924 are divided into two camps. The first of
these can be characterized as "formalistic courts," which employ
preexisting forms of property when fashioning their ultimate
remedies. In contrast, "realist courts" do not invoke property
forms when fashioning remedies to the dilemma.
In United States v Zaleski,94 the Second Circuit ruled on a
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) 41(g) motion
91 Nixon, 978 F2d at 1286. See also Loretto, 458 US at 441 (affirming the traditional rule that "a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking").
92 See Miller, 588 F3d at 419.
95 See Part IV. For further discussion of firearm control laws and their takings implications, see Roland Docal, Comment, The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments-the
PrecariousProtectors of the American Gun Collector, 23 Fla St U L Rev 1101, 1127-35
(1996).
94 686 F3d 90 (2d Cir 2012).
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brought by the defendant for the return of his confiscated firearms.95 After executing a search warrant on the defendant's
home, police discovered "a large cache" of firearms that included
several per se illegal weapons in addition to many legally possessed weapons.96 Instead of instituting forfeiture proceedings,
the government petitioned to retain and destroy the firearms
under the All Writs Act,97perhaps because the limitations period
had expired.98 The court's remedy allowed Zaleski to transfer his
weapons to a third-party gun dealer who would, acting as a trustee, sell the weapons and disburse the proceeds to Zaleski. This
arrangement was subject to several conditions: that it "would in
fact strip Zaleski of any power to exercise dominion and control
over [the firearms], [that the third-party gun dealer] is a suitable custodian and not subject to Zaleski's control, and [that] the
arrangement is otherwise equitable."9* The court also provided
that additional safeguards and qualifications-such as sale
deadlines, accounting procedures, and specific instructions for
the "trustee"-may be put into place to ensure that the defendant's powers over the weapons would never amount to the
level of control prohibited by the federal ban on constructive
possession.100
The Seventh Circuit also resorted to preexisting property
rules in an attempt to make sense of the firearm-disability dilemma in United States v Miller.O1 The court suggested that reliance on trusts to resolve the firearm-disability dilemma would
be appropriate. Additionally, the court proposed three other solutions to the dilemma, which included (1) allowing defendants
to make gifts of firearms to friends or relatives, as long as recipients could not return the firearms to the defendants or honor
their instructions; (2) having the government liquidate the firearms and disburse the proceeds to the felons; and (3) instructing the government to retain and store the firearms while the
Id at 91.
See id.
Act of Mar 3, 1911, §§ 234, 261, 262, ch 231, 36 Stat 1087, 1156, 1162, codified as
amended at 28 USC §1651.
98 See Zaleski, 686 F3d at 91-92. See also 28 USC § 1651(a) (authorizing federal
courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law").
99 Zaleski, 686 F3d at 93.
100 See id at 93-94. See also United States v Rodriguez, 2011 WL 5854369, *18-19
(WD Tex) (approving a firearm transfer to a nonrelative of the defendant in trust to either hold the firearms or sell them for the defendant).
101 588 F3d 418 (7th Cir 2009). See also notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
95
96
97
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defendants' disabilities continued.102 The court's gift proposal is
another traditional property remedy that other courts have also
considered.103

In contrast with the formalistic solutions, the Seventh Circuit's other suggestions-that the government either sell the
firearms on behalf of defendants or retain and store them for the
benefit of defendants-are not concerned with fitting the firearm-disability dilemma into a preexisting property category.
This approach instead focuses solely on the statutory dilemma,
and may thus be characterized as "realist" due to its direct approach to property rights.104
The Seventh Circuit is not the only court to pursue a realist
approach to the firearm-disability dilemma. The Fifth Circuit
used a similar method in Cooper v City of Greenwood, Mississippi,105 when a search warrant of an animal hospital led to the discovery of firearms on the premises.106 As a convicted felon, Earl
Roy Cooper was charged with violating § 922 for constructively
possessing the firearms, but because the court characterized the
firearms as derivative contraband, it held that Cooper retained a
residual property interest that was "limited to an ownership interest."107 Therefore, the court held that his § 1983 suit-which
allowed him to bring a claim against the local government for
deprivation of his due process rights-had merit in light of the
city's failure to conduct § 924 forfeiture proceedings before auctioning off the firearms.10s The court suggested that compelling
the City of Greenwood to sell the firearms for the account of the
defendant was an appropriate remedy to the firearm-disability
dilemma.109 This liquidation-and-disbursement remedy parallels

102 Miller, 588 F3d at 419-20.

103 See, for example, Rodriguez, 2011 WL 5854369 at *7 (suggesting that a complete
gift to the felon's brother would be inappropriate); United States v Parsons,472 F Supp
2d 1169, 1175 (ND Iowa 2007).
104 See Part IV.C.
10 904 F2d 302 (5th Cir 1990).
106 Id at 304.
107 Id at 305.
108 Id at 306.
109 The court's proposed remedy to the firearm-disability dilemma was inspired by
27 CFR § 72.39(a)(2), a provision of the ATF guidelines that dictates the sale of firearms
seized by the ATF for the account of petitioners who successfully petition for exception
from § 924 forfeiture proceedings. See Cooper, 904 F2d at 306.
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the Seventh Circuit's realist solutions, as it makes no mention of
traditional property institutions.110

B. Moralistic Approaches Denying Residual Property Rights
In contrast to courts that recognize convicted felons' firearm
property rights, some courts refuse to recognize any residual
rights in the firearm-disability dilemma context. While one of
these courts may have relied on a per se characterization of firearm contraband found in a convicted felon's possession,"'x most

courts ruling on this issue arguably rely primarily on moralistic
or public policy grounds when strictly construing the possession
ban.
In United States v Howell,112 the defendant sought the return of his firearms under FRCrP 41(g).113 The Eleventh Circuit

refused Howell's claim without any discussion of the requisite
§ 924 forfeiture proceedings, asserting that § 922 was "specifically designed to serve public policy and prevent convicted felons
from having either constructive or actual possession of firearms," adding that "[o]bviously, the courts cannot participate in
a criminal offense by returning firearms to a convicted felon."114

The Eighth Circuit also relied upon principle and policy in
United States v BagleyllS when rejecting an FRCrP 41(g) motion,
observing "that to allow [the defendant] to reap the economic
benefit from ownership of weapons [ I which it is illegal for him
to possess would make a mockery of the law."116

Although these courts explicitly rely upon strict constructions of § 922's firearm possession ban, the language they employ suggests that their nullification of both § 924's forfeiture
provisions and the default rule mandating the return of seized
110 See Cooper, 904 F2d at 306. See also United States v Approximately 627 Firearms, More or Less, 589 F Supp 2d 1129, 1140 (SD Iowa 2008) (ordering the liquidation
and disbursement of the defendant's personal firearms so as to "restore [the defendant],
as closely as possible under the circumstances, to the same position he would have been
in had the Government not seized his personal firearms to begin with"); Watts v United
States, 2002 WL 999320, *3 (ND Tex) (recommending that the government pay fair market value for the felon's seized firearms in a firearm-disability dilemma).
III United States v Felici, 208 F3d 667, 670 (8th Cir 2000) (strictly construing the
possession ban but noting that this construction is "[b]ased upon Felici's status as a convicted felon").
112 425 F3d 971 (11th Cir 2005).
113 Id at 972.
114 Id at 977.
115 899 F2d 707 (8th Cir 1990).
116 Id at 708 (citation omitted and second brackets in original).
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property117 is primarily grounded in public policy and moral
intuitions.118

III. JUDICIAL CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Intuitively, it seems that felons subject to the firearmdisability dilemma should retain some kind of residual property
right, as ruling otherwise would render the § 924 forfeiture provisions a nullity in contravention of a court's duty to give effect
to "every clause and word of a statute."119 This Comment proposes that one way to give meaning to both § 922's firearm disability and § 924's forfeiture requirements is to look for and recognize any residual rights that persist beyond a ban on firearm
possession. As will be shown, courts determining whether property rights exist regularly rely upon conceptualizations of property to reach their decisions. And as Professor Hanoch Dagan
observes, there are competing views as to the best way to conceptualize property rights, because "[p]roperty is torn between
form and substance."120 While these conceptualizations of property are by no means mutually exclusive, this insight suggests
that a judge's predisposition to either substantive or formalistic
views of property may influence the remedies he or she prescribes. Additionally, some judges also appear to employ moral
conceptualizations of property rights, a judicial construction that
is especially pertinent in the firearm-disability dilemma context.
Accordingly, this Part analyzes judicial conceptualizations of
property rights through formal, substantive, and moral lenses in
order to provide a broader context for understanding the interests at stake in the firearm-disability dilemma.
A.

Substance of Property: Bundles of Rights

The debate over the proper conceptualization of property is
rigorous. However, the historic view of property as rights in
United States v LaFatch, 565 F2d 81, 83 (6th Cir 1977).
118 See United States v Roberts, 322 Fed Appx 175, 176-77 (3d Cir 2009) (relying
summarily upon the Howell decision and its reasoning). See also United States v Headley, 50 Fed Appx 266, 267 (6th Cir 2002) (construing the possession ban strictly without
discussion of § 924); United States u Oleson, 2008 WL 2945458, *2-3 (ND Iowa) (rejecting
the defendant's request to allow the firearms to be gifted to his sister based upon a strict
construction of the § 922 possession ban).
119 United States v Menasche, 348 US 528, 538-39 (1955). This provision of § 924
would be rendered inoperative if courts failed to require the government to provide process within 120 days.
120 Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property,91 Cal L Rev 1517, 1519 (2003).
117
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specified objects's' has largely been replaced with the legal realist notion of the "bundle of rights" property owners hold with respect to others, a view first summarized by Professor Wesley
Hohfeld.122 While this view of property is not without its detractors, 123 courts continue to utilize this conceptual device in determining the nature of novel property rights. Three examples of
the employment of this judicial tool-In re Marriage of Graham,124 Moore v Regents of the University of California,125 and
United States v Craftl26isuffice to demonstrate its utility.
In re Marriageof Graham posed the question of whether an
MBA degree constitutes property subject to Colorado's marital
property division legislation.127 In determining the scope of the
term "property," the Supreme Court of Colorado held that property includes "everything that has an exchangeable value or
which goes to make up wealth or estate."128 The court also noted

other characteristics of property, including "whether [something]
can be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged, or
121 See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in J. Roland Pennock and
John W. Chapman, eds, Property: Nomos XXI 69, 73 (NYU 1980) ('The conception of
property held by the legal and political theorists of classical liberalism coincided precisely with the present popular idea, the notion of thing-ownership.).
122 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L J 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 Yale L J 16 (1913).
See also Cook, Hohfeld's Contributionsat 14 (cited in note 77) (positing that Hohfeld's
scholarship demonstrates that "what the owner of property has is a very complex aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities").
123 See, for example, Dagan, 91 Cal L Rev at 1570 (cited in note 120) (arguing for a
conceptualization of property that combines both the bundles-of-rights theory and forms
of property, a union he describes as "property institutions"); Adam Mossoff, What Is
Property?Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 Ariz L Rev 371, 376 (2003) (promoting a
conceptualization of property that embraces the right to exclude in addition to rights of
acquisition, use, and disposal, such that the aggregate of these rights gives "full meaning
to the concept of property); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77
Neb L Rev 730, 730 (1998):
[The right to exclude others is more than just "one of the most essential" constituents of property-it is the sine qua non. Give someone the right to exclude
others from a valued resource . . . and you give them property. Deny someone
the exclusion right and they do not have property.
J.E. Penner, The '21undle of Rights"Pictureof Property,43 UCLA L Rev 711, 714 (1996)
("'Property is a bundle of rights' is little more than a slogan.... There is no real 'theory'
that property is a bundle of rights").
124 574 P2d 75 (Colo 1979).
125 793 P2d 479 (Cal 1990).
126 535 US 274 (2002).
127 Graham,574 P2d at 75.
128 Id at 77.
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whether it terminates on the death of the owner."129 With this

conception of property in mind, the court concluded that a graduate degree does not constitute property, asserting that "[i]t
does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable
value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be
assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged."n0 Thus, after
first defining the bundle of rights that comprises a full property
right, the court determined that the failure of a degree to embody any of these individual rights compelled a ruling that educational degrees do not constitute property.1ax
The Supreme Court of California was faced with a similarly
difficult question in Moore v Regents of the University of California, where it was required to assess the limits of an individual's
property rights in the cellular structure and genetic materials
contained in his surgically removed spleen.12 The UCLA Medical Center used John Moore's spleen to isolate a unique cellular
structure from which a commercially valuable blood product was
derived. Moore brought a claim for tortious conversion of his genetic material.133 The court noted that in order to substantiate
his claim, Moore needed to "establish an actual interference
with his ownership or right of possession."1s4 In addition to these
two sticks of a full property-right bundle, the court also discussed the right of control, equating control with "so many of the
rights ordinarily attached to property."35 After assessing these
three elements-ownership, possession, and control-of a full
property right, the court concluded that there was no evidence
that Moore had retained any of these rights in sufficient quantity to merit a claim for conversion.136
The bundle-of-rights conceptualization of property is not the
exclusive domain of state supreme courts, as the Supreme Court
also uses this analytical tool to flesh out uncertain property
rights. In United States v Craft, the Court was required to determine "whether a tenant by the entirety possesses 'property' or
129

Id.

180 Id.

Graham,574 P2d at 77.
182 Moore, 793 P2d at 487-89.
133 Id at 480-82.
134 Id at 488.
1a1

1a5 Id at 492 (discussing California statutory restrictions on the control of excised
cells, and exploring whether the right of control persists despite the restrictions).
136 Moore, 793 P2d at 496.
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'rights to property' to which a federal tax lien may attach."137
Eight years of tax delinquency prompted the IRS to attach a tax
lien to real property located in Grand Rapids, Michigan, where
Mr. and Mrs. Craft owned the land as tenants by the entirety. In
Michigan, tenants by the entirety have "no separate interest" in
jointly held property, such that it was not clear whether a tax
lien specific to Mr. Craft could attach to the land.8 In order to
ascertain whether Mr. Craft did have an independent property
interest, the Court compared the rights Mr. Craft held to the
rights it deemed essential to a complete property bundle. Mr.
Craft's rights included the right to exclude others from property,
the right to use property, the right to receive income produced or
derived therefrom, the right of control, the right to alienate or
otherwise encumber property with the consent of the other
spouse, and the right of survivorship.139 The Court found that
the only significant "stick" from a full property right "bundle"
that Mr. Craft did not possess was the right to unilaterally alienate the property. 40 After conceptualizing the property rights
at stake in this manner, the Court found that Mr. Craft's property
rights were sufficient to accommodate tax lien attachment. 141
While these cases address disparate asserted property
rights, they uniformly utilize the bundle-of-rights conception of
property in determining what constitutes property. This substantive perception of property thus serves as a judicial tool for
discerning the contours of uncertain property rights.
B. Forms of Property: Classification, Induction, and Deduction
Formal conceptions of property have a long tradition of being used by the judiciary to resolve property conflicts arising between individuals. A formalistic conceptualization of property
presumes that existing legal institutions embody
a scientific system of rules and institutions that [are] complete in that the system made right answers available in all
137 Craft, 535 US at 276.

138 Id at 277. See also text accompanying note 149.
189 Craft, 535 US at 283-85.
140 Id at 284.

141 Id at 288. For an excellent summary of the Craft Court's "bundle of rights" analysis, see Dagan, 91 Cal L Rev at 1518-26, 1532-35 (cited in note 120) ("To shift from labels to substance, Justice O'Connor invoked the Hohfeldian conception of property as a
'bundle of sticks'-a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property.") (quotation marks omitted).
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cases; formal in that right answers could be derived from
the autonomous, logical working out of the system; conceptually ordered in that ground-level rules could all be derived
from a few fundamental principles; . . .12
Courts employing a formal conception of property rights are
tasked with the "classification, induction, and deduction" of asserted property rights into preexisting forms of property.14 After
determining what form of property best approximates the asserted rights, courts then fashion their rulings by applying the
preexisting rules associated with the identified property form, as
demonstrated in the following two examples.
In People v Minch,u44 the Michigan Supreme Court recently
demonstrated the formalistic approach in the context of their
state counterpart to the federal firearm-disability dilemma. After examining the state's firearm-disability statute-which terminates the disability after five years if certain conditions are
met-the court concluded that the legislation created a "constructive bailment .. . between defendant and the police de-

partment."145 This was because "nothing in the statute severs a
felon's ownership interest in his or her firearms," but it instead
simply prohibits physical and constructive possession.14 Accordingly, the court directed the police department and any successor bailees to conform to bailment requirements, as this was the
legal relationship most closely approximated by the state's firearm disability.147

Justices Antonin Scalia's and Clarence Thomas's dissents in
Craft present another excellent example of the application of
formalistic property theory. As outlined above, the Court had to
determine the nature of tenancy-by-the-entirety property rights
for the purposes of IRS tax liens.148 Justice Thomas explained
that under Michigan and English common law, "property held as
a tenancy by the entirety does not belong to either spouse, but to
Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U Chi L Rev 607, 608-09 (1999).
Dagan, 91 Cal L Rev at 1527 (cited in note 120).
144 825 NW2d 560 (Mich 2012).
146 Id at 563.
146 Id at 562-63.
147 Id at 563-64. It is important to note that, while bailments generally do not create
formal fiduciary duties between the bailee and bailor, they usually include an understanding that a bailee will "safeguard the personal property of [the bailor] and exercise[]
complete dominion at all times over the property." Bailments, 8 Corpus Juris Secundum
§ 1 at 366-67 (cited in note 5).
148 See notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
142
148
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a single entity composed of the married persons.... Neither
spouse has any separate interest in such an estate."149 Justice

Scalia suggested that the purpose of this form of property ownership was to "benefit [ ] the stay-at-home spouse or mother" by
(1) providing her with the right of survivorship, and (2) shielding
her from any indebtedness that her husband may incur.150 By
conceptualizing the property right as a preexisting form of property, the dissenters in Craft relied on the ready-made legal institution of tenancy by the entirety to dictate the resolution of an
otherwise complicated substantive "sticks" inquiry.
As demonstrated by these cases, the task of a court formalistically conceptualizing property is straightforward. Instead of
reciting and analyzing a list of undertheorized rights that are
deemed essential to a full property bundle, formalistic courts
find the preexisting form of property that is most analogous to
the situation at hand and apply established rules to resolve the
dispute. While this approach benefits from building upon established legal rules, it is subject to the legal realist critique that it
promotes form while obscuring substance.'5' Nonetheless, it is
an effective tool that courts can employ when ascertaining the
boundaries of uncertain property rights.
C.

Policy of Property: Normative Assessments of Rights

In addition to substantive and formalistic views of property,
courts also employ moralistic conceptualizations of property
when reconciling conflicting and uncertain property interests.
Indeed, "morality has been a strong force in American public
life," such that when wrongful possession is implicated-as it is
in the context of a firearm disability-"[c]ourts regularly have
examined the legitimacy of possession of chattels, and have refused to accord possessory rights when they have found ... misconduct on the part of the [potential] possessor."152 Thus, while a
default property rule may require granting special property
rights to unsavory characters, some courts refuse to recognize
these rights when a state's public policy deems the potential recipient a wrongful actor.

149 Craft, 535 US at 292 (Thomas dissenting) (quotation marks omitted).

150 Id at 289-90 (Scalia dissenting).
151 See Dagan, 91 Cal L Rev at 1527 (cited in note 120).
152 R.H. Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels. Hornbook Law and Case Law,
80 Nw U L Rev 1221, 1222-24 (1986).
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For example, in Jones v Metcalf,sa the Supreme Court of
Vermont applied a moralistic interpretation of property rights to
invalidate a trapper's claim of conversion. The plaintiff had set a
bear trap that did not comport with statutory requirements, and
the defendant-a local game warden-discovered the illegal construction of the trap and seized it and the bear it had killed.154
The plaintiff sued to recover the value of the bear's spoiled meat,
the hide, and the time he lost searching for the confiscated trap.
The trapper based his claim on the common law rule that reducing wild animals to possession creates property rights in formerly ferae naturae. 55 Regarding both the game and trap, the court
found that the law "will not enforce claims made in contravention of its mandates," and that "courts of justice will not sustain
actions in regards to ... property, which have for their object the
violation of law."15* As the trapper's method of hunting was
deemed illegal, he received no protection of his otherwise-valid
property rights because "the act of reducing a wild animal to
possession, as affecting the question of ownership, must not be
wrongful."1'5
Dorrell v Clarkise provides another example of a moralistic
interpretation of property rights. Elmer Dorrell installed two
slot machines in his billiard parlor in violation of state law. After the local sheriff discovered and confiscated the slot machines, Dorrell commenced an action alleging that he was entitled to the money in the slot machines.15e The court held that
ownership of the money was originally vested in the individuals
who placed the money into the slot machine, and that even after
a limitations period extinguished their claim, the owner of the
slot machine should still be precluded from obtaining ownership
over the property.160 This was because "the power of our courts,
either at law or in equity, cannot be invoked in aid of one showing a violation of the law."16 The court deemed this outcome "in
conformity with the public policy of the state and of good mor153
154
155
156
157

119 A 430 (Vt 1923).
Id at 431.
Id at 432.
Id.
Jones, 119 A at 432. See also Dapson v Daly, 153 NE 454, 454 (Mass 1926)

(granting special import to the fact that the plaintiff was not a licensed hunter, and
therefore "was not entitled to the rights of a huntsman").
1s 4 P2d 712 (Mont 1931).
159 Id at 712-13.
160 Id at 714.
161 Id.
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als," despite the lack of on-point forfeiture legislation.162 The
New York Court of Appeals reached an identical outcome in a
case involving illegal gambling winnings.16
In all of these cases, courts applied a legal presumption that
property rights stemming from wrongdoing do not deserve judicial recognition, despite common law default rules that would
otherwise vest title in the wrongdoer. This view is based on the
"public policy of the state and of good morals,"6 and amounts to
a judicial determination that, under certain circumstances, default property rules may be ignored in favor of normative assessments of public policy. Accordingly, this conceptualization of
property serves as yet another judicial tool for ascertaining the
scope of uncertain property rights. When taken in conjunction
with substantive and formalistic conceptions of property rights,
courts are equipped with three means by which they can comprehend and recognize otherwise ambiguous property rights.
IV. RESOLVING THE FIREARM-DISABILITY DILEMMA

The judicial tools of substantive, formalistic, and moralistic
conceptualizations of property explored in Part III are well suited for resolving the firearm-disability dilemma. The basic problem presented by the inconsistency of §§ 922 and 924 is the determination of what should follow the termination of physical
and constructive possession rights from an otherwise-complete
title to firearm property. The statutory ambiguity can be interpreted either as fashioning new property rights or as extinguishing old title. This Part first shows that courts choosing to completely invalidate a felon's firearm property rights are employing
moralistic conceptualizations of property rights that generate
"clean hands" remedies. Conversely, courts recognizing a residual property right in felon firearm property often approach the dilemma either substantively or formalistically. Substantive conceptualizations generate realist solutions specially tailored to
the firearm-disability dilemma. Formalistic conceptualizations
generate formal solutions that are similarly well suited to the
problem, while also benefitting from applicable preexisting rules
162 Dorrell, 4 P2d at 714.
163 See Hofferman v Simmons, 49 NE2d 523, 526 (NY 1943) ("To say that a profes-

sional gambler ... can invoke the aid of the courts to get back from the police monies
[obtained] in defiance of the law, is to say that the courts will ... give their sanction to
titles and possessory rights founded only on lawbreaking.").
164 See text accompanying note 162.
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that courts have long experience applying in different contexts.
This Part examines the advantages and disadvantages of each of
these conceptualizations and resulting remedies in the context of
the firearm-disability dilemma, and concludes by proposing a
constructive trust and power-of-appointment solution that
draws on the strengths of each approach.
A.

Moralistic Solution: Clean Hands

A moralistic conceptualization of property rights provides a
simple solution to the firearm-disability dilemma.16r Viewed
through such a lens, a court is free to reject the residual property rights asserted by convicted felons if such a solution is supported by public policy. As discussed above, in passing the Crime
Control Act, Congress explicitly expressed a public policy
against allowing felons to possess firearms.166 Because the mor-

alistic view of property provides courts with precedent supporting rulings that completely extinguish the property rights of
wrongdoers (a label that criminal conviction inevitably affixes
upon felons),e6 it is a useful judicial tool for courts seeking to resolve the firearm-disability dilemma in favor of the government.
It also allows a court to avoid expending judicial resources determining which remedy best recognizes asserted residual
rights. Finally, under this solution, courts can avoid politically
unsavory remedies that recognize property rights in wrongdoers.168
This is precisely what the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits did-albeit without explicitly invoking a moralistic
conception of property rights-when they refused to recognize
felons' residual rights in seized firearms.169 Some of these courts
justified their rulings in part by reference to the doctrine of unclean hands, which "is an equitable doctrine that allows a court
to withhold equitable relief if such relief would encourage or reward illegal activity."170 The courts also observed that recogniz-

ing firearm property rights in felons would be repugnant to
165 See Part III.C.

166 See note 14 and accompanying text.
167 Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw U L Rev 453,
457-58 (1997) (discussing the condemnation that the criminal law affixes to convicts).
168 See note 152 and accompanying text.
169 See notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
170 United States v Felici, 208 F3d 667, 670-71 (8th Cir 2000) (noting that FRCrP
41(g) motions are brought in equity). See also Howell, 425 F3d at 974 ("The defendant in
the instant case has come into court with extremely 'unclean hands.' One engaged in this
type of criminal conduct is hardly entitled to equitable relief.").
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public policy.171 By focusing on public policy and the unclean
hands of convicted felons, the courts in essence concluded that
"whatever may or may not be done with the [property] in the
custody of the [government], the power of our courts, either at
law or in equity, cannot be invoked in aid of one showing a violation of the law."172
While the moralistic conception of property rights provides a
straightforward solution to the problem, it is subject to at least
three serious weaknesses. First, a strict construction of § 922's
possession ban that completely extinguishes a felon's property
rights renders § 924's forfeiture provision a nullity. If Congress
intended to extinguish all of felons' property rights in their firearms when enacting the Crime Control Act, then why did it include the § 924 forfeiture provisions and subsequently strengthen them with the addition of a 120-day limitations period? A
court would be hard pressed to reconcile these provisions with
its refusal to recognize residual property rights in the firearms.
Courts reaching this result effectively read the provisions out of
the statute, thereby violating the canon of statutory construction
that imposes a duty upon courts to "give effect, if possible, to
every clause and word of a statute ... rather than to emasculate
an entire section."173

Another problem with the public policy approach is that it
fails to recognize that it is the government's failure to timely institute § 924 forfeiture proceedings that generates the firearmdisability dilemma, through no fault of the convicted felons.
Analogy to the doctrine of laches is appropriate, which was "developed and designed to protect ... against those who have slept
upon their rights, with knowledge and ample opportunity to assert them."174 Laches is "an equitable doctrine that may be asserted to deny relief to a party whose unconscionable delay in
enforcing his rights has prejudiced the party against whom relief is sought."175 Under the terms of this analogy, a felon may be
171 Howell, 425 F3d at 977 (asserting that § 922 was "specifically designed to serve
public policy and prevent convicted felons from having either constructive or actual possession of firearms'); Bagley, 899 F2d at 708 ("Mo allow [Bagley] to reap the economic
benefit from ownership of weapons [ ] which it is illegal for him to possess would make a
mockery of the law.") (second and third alterations in original). See also notes 111-18
and accompanying text.

172 Dorrell, 4 P2d at 714.
173
174
175

United States v Menasche, 348 US 528, 538-39 (1955) (quotation marks omitted).
Ewert v Bluejacket, 259 US 129, 138 (1922).
Robbins v People, 107 P3d 384, 388 (Colo 2005).
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considered a wrongdoer by virtue of his felony conviction, but a
government entity that slept upon its firearm forfeiture rights
must also be held accountable to the standards imposed by Congress. Although the doctrine of laches is inapplicable to the situation at hand,176 it does demonstrate legal recognition of the public policy behind limitations periods. This policy of punishing
those who sleep on their rights cuts against a normative approach to the firearm-disability dilemma that lays all liability at
the feet of convicted felons without recognizing the government's
wrongdoing.
A final drawback of the moralistic approach-as the only
conceptualization that extinguishes all of a felon's property
rights-is the concern that failure to recognize any residual
property rights may constitute a Fifth Amendment taking.
Judge Easterbrook confirmed the salience of this concern by implication, suggesting that a failure to recognize some of a defendant's rights in his firearms would result in unnecessary and
inefficient expenditures of judicial resources as the parties litigated subsequent takings claims.77
In summary, a moralistic approach catalyzed by the public
policy conceptualization of property rights provides courts with
an easy solution to the firearm-disability dilemma. The simplicity of this solution comes at the cost of nullifying § 924 forfeiture
proceedings, creating perverse incentives for the government to
sleep on its rights when instituting forfeiture proceedings, and
possibly working an unconstitutional taking of the property.
B. Formalistic Solutions: Bailments, Trusts, and Powers of
Appointment
A formalistic approach to the firearm-disability dilemma results in the categorization of a felon's residual property rights
into a preexisting legal form of property ownership.17a Courts
employing this conceptualization of property have analogized
176 The invocation of laches generally requires demonstration of (1) an unreasonable
delay by one party in the assertion of his rights and (2) a resulting prejudice to the party
raising the laches defense. United States v Mandycz, 447 F3d 951, 965 (6th Cir 2006).
Congress has defined "unreasonable delay" as a 120-day delay in the commencement of
§ 924(d) forfeiture proceedings. But there is no danger of a felon suffering prejudice due
to his reliance on firearm property rights in himself, because the guns are always in the
government's possession.
177 See Miller, 588 F3d at 419. For an extended treatment of the takings question,
see Part I.B.3.
178 See Part III.B.
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the legal rights emerging from the intersection of §§ 922 and 924
to several previously recognized forms of property. Multiple
courts have explicitly decided that trusts and bailments are the
most appropriate resolutions of the firearm-disability dilemma,
while others implicitly prescribe a power-of-appointment remedy
to preserve residual property rights. The merits of each of these
remedies deserve some attention.
The most prevalent formalistic method of resolving the firearm-disability dilemma is analogizing to trusts. 179 Originating
from the English concept of "use" as enforced in equity,50 the

tool of trust severs legal and equitable title to property.xax Trustees hold legal title and owe beneficiaries a fiduciary duty to
manage the property for their benefit.12 Correspondingly, bene-

ficiaries hold equitable title to the property, such that they enjoy
the net income generated by the trust arrangement. 183
As applied to the firearm-disability dilemma, courts seeking
to recognize a residual property right can rely upon the "trust"
form of property, whereby a felon-beneficiary retains equitable
title and "ownership" of his firearms.184 The formal trust allays
concerns over physical possession and control via constructive
possession, since "a trustee is not subject to the control of ... the
beneficiaries except to the extent the terms of the trust reserve
or confer some such power over the trustee."85 If utilized, a trust

remedy to the firearm-disability dilemma entails simple recognition of a felon's retention of equitable title, which § 922 does not
purport to extinguish. Several courts have employed trust analogies to decide the firearm-disability dilemma.186
179 See notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
180 Herbert Thorndike Tiffany, 1 The Law of Real Property § 221 at 390-91 (Callaghan 3d ed 1939).
181 Robert J. Lynn and Grayson M.P. McCouch, Introduction to Estate Planning
§ 8.1 at 168-69 (West 5th ed 2004).
182 Id at 168.
1sa Id at 168-69.
184 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2, comment d (2003) ("The term 'owner' is used
in this Restatement to indicate a person by whom one or more interests are held for the
person's own benefit.').
185 Id at § 5, comment e. See also id (noting that "a trust may be created without the
consent or even the knowledge of either the beneficiaries or the trustee," and that "[a]
trustee can maintain an action with respect to trust property, but ordinarily a beneficiary cannot").
186 See, for example, Zaleski, 686 F3d at 93 (2d Cir) (noting after exploring the
rights associated with trusts that "[s]ole possession and exclusive control of the firearms
by a third party may extinguish the felon's possessory interest"); Miller, 588 F3d at 420
(7th Cir) (deeming trusts an appropriate remedy to the firearm-disability dilemma).
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Another formalistic solution that courts have explicitly applied to the firearm-disability dilemma is analogizing to bailments. Under this construction, the government holds property
as bailee, to whom the firearms are delivered for the purpose of
safekeeping for the duration of the felon's (or bailor's) disability. 1e The difference between bailments and trusts is that the
trustee has a fiduciary duty to manage the property for the felon's benefit, while a bailee has only a duty of safekeeping.as Two
courts have proposed this approach.189
A third formal solution to the dilemma is to allow a felon to
exercise a power of appointment, subject to some limitations.
Powers of appointment entail the power "to designate recipients
of beneficial interests in property."190 In other words, a felon
with the power of appointment can determine to whom the government should confer the firearms. Judges may assuage their
concerns that such a remedy amounts to constructive possession
by fashioning a nongeneral exclusionary power of appointment,
which would restrict the felon's ability to grant the property to
certain enumerated individuals, perhaps including himself, close
relatives, and friends.191 Thus, the power of appointment grants
courts the flexibility to alleviate § 922 possession concerns while
simultaneously giving import to § 924's forfeiture limitations. It
also allows judges to recognize the residual ownership right of
exclusion. Implicitly, this solution has been suggested by at least
two courts. 192

187 See Bailments, 8 Corpus Juris Secundum § 1 at 366 (cited in note 5) (defining
bailments comprehensively as "a delivery of personalty for some particular purpose .. .
[and] that after the purpose has been fulfilled it shall be redelivered to the person who
delivered it").
188 See note 147.

189 See Minch, 825 NW2d at 563 (Mich) (holding that a state felon possession ban
created a "constructive bailment" relationship); Miller, 588 F3d at 420 (7th Cir) (proposing "storage of the firearms by the United States while [the defendant's] firearms disability continues").
190 Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 11.1 (1986).
191 See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 17.3
(2011) (discussing nongeneral powers); id at § 17.5, comment h (describing exclusionary
powers).
192 See Miller, 588 F3d at 420 (7th Cir) (suggesting that the power to make a complete gift to a friend or relative with certain restrictive conditions in place would resolve
the conflict between §§ 922 and 924); United States v Parsons,472 F Supp 2d 1169, 1175
(ND Iowa 2007) (stating that allowing the defendant to designate to whom the firearms
should be given "does not rise to the level of constructive possession but is, instead, permitting [the defendant] to exercise only the merest indicia of ownership).

1262

C.

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[80:1231

Realist Solution: Liquidation and Disbursement

The substantive view of property encourages judicial inquiry
into the best means of recognizing the individual "sticks" of
property rights to which a property owner is legally entitled. In
the context of the firearm-disability dilemma, such an analysis
would proceed by (1) exploring the nature of a full complement
of property rights and (2) assessing which rights remain after
the dilemma is triggered. The Graham, Moore, and Craft cases
used to demonstrate the substantive conceptualization of property also provide important guidance in this context.193
In Graham, the Supreme Court of Colorado suggested that
exchangeable value and rights of alienability were key considerations in defining property.19 As these are critical elements of
property, it follows that a full property right must include the
power to alienate and obtain value for property. In Moore, the
California Supreme Court focused on the rights of ownership,
possession, and control as the basis of complete property
rights.195 Finally, in Craft, the US Supreme Court enumerated
many sticks in the property bundle, including exclusion, use,
control, alienation, and receipt of income derived from the
property.196
If one were to subtract from these enumerations of critical
property rights the right of possession as defined in Part I.B.1,
which also encompasses a degree of control, it is readily apparent that the entire property bundle is not extinguished. In other
words, these cases make it clear that residual property rights
still persist in the absence of possession. In Graham,the right to
obtain the value of property does not implicate possession or
control.197 Similarly, the Moore enumeration of property rights
explicitly preserves ownership even if possession and control are
lost. Finally, while the possession barred by § 922 is implicated
to some degree by the Craft sticks of use, control, alienation, and
exclusion, there is no such implication by the right to the receipt
193 See Part III.A.
194 See Graham, 574 P2d at 77 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1382 (West 4th ed
1968), for the proposition that property consists of "everything that has an exchangeable
value or which goes to make up wealth or estate").
195 See Moore, 793 P2d at 488 (holding that for the tort of conversion, a plaintiffs
property rights of possession and ownership must be violated, which will often implicate
the right to control).
196 Craft, 535 US at 279-83 (discussing the rights associated with a tenancy by the
entirety and comparing these rights to "the most essential property rights").
197 See notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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of income derived from property-another stick the Craft Court
deemed critical. Although these cases are not consistent in determining which rights are necessary to constitute a complete
property right, they are consistent in their understanding that
the right to receive value derived from property is an ownership
right common to most property bundles.198
Were a realist court to determine that the only meaningful
property right that persists in the firearm-disability dilemma
situation is ownership-defined as the right to receive value derived from property-then its remedy would seek to restore that
value to the felon. One logical way to protect this right entails
liquidation of the property by government agents and disbursement of the proceeds to the felon. This exact remedy has been
suggested or employed by at least three courts faced with the
firearm-disability dilemma.199
The liquidation-and-disbursement remedy presents a clean
solution to the firearm-disability dilemma by directly targeting
the residual ownership interest retained by felons. In addition to
recognizing felons' retained rights,200 it also removes the perverse incentive for the government to sleep on its rights and
simultaneously furthers the public policy objective of keeping
firearms out of the hands of felons.201 Additionally, courts employing this approach are liberated from the task of finding the
correct legal form with which to preserve residual firearm property rights, although they must instead engage in the work of
exploring which substantive rights remain in the absence of possession and constructive control. One problem this remedy raises is whether courts have the authority to order government
agencies to act as auctioneers for convicted felons. In Cooper, the

198 See Craft, 535 US at 283 (noting the importance of the right to income derived
from property); Moore, 793 P2d at 488, 491-92 (exploring ownership rights as distinct
from possessory or control rights, and contemplating that such rights would include the
right to value derived from excised cells); Graham, 574 P2d at 77 (citing the right to "exchangeable value" as a useful shorthand for property).
199 See Miller, 588 F3d at 419 (7th Cir) (suggesting that the sale of the firearms and
disbursement to the defendant would be a lawful remedy); United States v Approximately 627 Firearms,More or Less, 589 F Supp 2d 1129, 1140 (SD Iowa 2008) (ordering a liquidation and disbursement remedy, since "it would restore [the defendant], as closely as
possible under the circumstances, to the same position he would have been in had the
Government not seized his personal firearms to begin with"); Cooper, 904 F2d at 306 (5th
Cir) (approving an ATF regulatory remedy that would allow the court to order the sale of
firearms for the account of the claimant).
200 See note 177 and accompanying text.
201 See note 85 and accompanying text.
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court correctly suggests that such a remedy is not entirely novel,
as relevant ATF regulations contemplate a similar approach.202
Obliging the government to "act as a felon's auctioneer"203 would
likely seem objectionable to moralistic courts, but may be the
best a realist court can do given that it was the government's
failure to adhere to § 924's forfeiture requirements that precipitated the dilemma in the first place.
D.

Constructive Trust and the Power of Appointment: A
Formalistic Solution Informed by Realist and Moralistic
Considerations

While the property conceptualizations outlined above provide resolutions to the firearm-disability dilemma, all are subject to certain shortcomings. Strictly moralistic approaches promote public policies at the expense of ignoring the forfeiture
provisions, incentivizing governmental laziness in instituting
forfeiture, and possibly working unconstitutional takings. Realist conceptualizations of felon firearm property rights are well
suited to discerning which rights persist after possession is prohibited, but the liquidation-and-disbursement solution offends
moralistic sensibilities by forcing the government to act as a felon's auctioneer. Formalistic remedies benefit from the readymade rules associated with various property forms. But as long
as possession is precluded and some residual right is recognized,
formalism offers little guidance as to which form of property best
resolves the dilemma.
Consideration of each approach's concomitant strengths and
weaknesses does suggest, however, that the various conceptualizations may be used in combination to avoid their idiosyncratic
pitfalls and arrive at a more deliberative resolution of the firearm-disability dilemma. Public policy dictates that felon firearm
possession be strictly curtailed, and that government resources
not be expended to preserve firearm value for felons.204 Substantive analysis suggests that courts, at a minimum, should recognize a residual ownership right that preserves the value of
seized firearms for felons.205 With these guiding considerations,

202 See note 109. See also Approximately 627 Firearms,More or Less, 589 F Supp 2d
at 1140 (citing with approval Cooper's suggestion that courts enjoy this authority).
203 Miller, 588 F3d at 419.
204 See notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
205 See notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
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courts can fashion formalistic remedies that benefit from previously established property rules.206

One formalistic solution that comports with these principles
is a constructive trust with a power of appointment in the felonbeneficiary. Courts are empowered in equity to impose constructive trusts when a delinquent party has acquired property by
"unjust, unconscionable, or unlawful means."207 In the firearmdisability-dilemma context, the government's continued possession may be characterized as "unjust" or "unlawful," since the
government holds the guns in violation of a defendant's right to
have his property returned under the seized property default
rule.208 If a constructive trust is imposed, equitable title immediately vests in the defendant beneficiary, and the "rights and duties of the parties [] are the same as if an express trust had
been created."209

Because constructive trusts are judicial creations, courts can
adapt the trust relationship to the firearm-disability dilemma.210
To avoid forcing the government into a trustee position, the
court may remove trustee status due to "unfitness."11 A court

may also preserve a defendant's rights of exclusion and alienability by vesting a nongeneral exclusionary power of appointment in the defendant,212 which would allow him to choose the

206

See Part III.B.

Caryl A. Yzenbaard, George Gleason Bogert, and George Taylor Bogert, The Law
of Trusts and Trustees § 471 at 2 (West 3d ed 2009).
208 See note 38 and accompanying text. It is also important to remember that it is
the government's failure to timely institute forfeiture that initiates the dilemma. See
text accompanying notes 174-76.
209 Yzenbaard, Bogert, and Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 471 at 13 (cited in note
207).
210 See id § 472 at 58-61 (exploring several judicial decrees that typically accompany
constructive trusts, including ordering the sale of property and delivery of proceeds to
plaintiffs).
211 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 107, comment b (1959) (suggesting merely that
some kind of "cause" is required for unfitness removal). Courts broadly construe the
grounds for removal of a trustee, such that either the underlying wrongful retention of
the firearms past § 924's 120-day limitations period or a court's simple reluctance to
force the government into a trustee relationship with a felon-beneficiary could justify
designating a different trustee in equity. See George Gleason Bogert and George Taylor
Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 527 at 48-98 (West rev 2d ed 1993) (observing
that "[t]he number of possible situations which may make it desirable to remove a trustee is very large," and that a "personal interest' adverse to the beneficiary or an inappropriate appropriation of property-two situations that are analogous to the firearmdisability dilemma-are sufficient to displace a trustee).
212 See notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
207
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subsequent trustee. 213 Finally, the court could stipulate that the
successor trustee's fiduciary duties were limited to liquidation of
the firearms and disbursement of the proceeds to the defendant.214 ThiS would recognize a felon's ownership right in the firearms' value.215
As long as the pool of potential trustees is sufficiently narrow and the court strictly limits the trustee's duties to liquidation and disbursement, the power of appointment would not
amount to constructive possession.216 The constructive trust and

power-of-appointment arrangement grants the defendant "dominion or control" over the firearms' monetary value, but completely removes physical control over both the firearms themselves and their lethal power. Since Congress was concerned
about this latter value when it created the firearm disability,217 a
power of appointment in this context does not implicate the concerns motivating Congress when it outlawed constructive possession. Furthermore, limiting potential trustees in this manner
fails to rise to the level of constructive possession altogether, as
long as the recipient refuses to accept a felon's instructions concerning the firearms' disposition.218
In summary, a constructive trust and appurtenant power of
appointment functionally give defendants the power to choose a
"trustee" to liquidate their firearm property and a right to the
proceeds derived from the firearms. This remedy avoids burdening the government with maintenance of a felon's firearm interests, thus satisfying some moralistic concerns. Its flexibility accommodates the preservation of residual ownership rights,
thereby benefitting from substantive analysis and mitigating potential takings claims. Finally, it benefits from the ready-made
property rules associated with long-recognized legal forms, thus
drawing on the advantages of the formalistic approach. Accordingly, the constructive-trust and power-of-appointment arrangement synthesizes into a comprehensive remedy the property
213 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 108, comment i (1959) (noting that trust
instruments may grant beneficiaries the power to select trustees); Bogert and Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees § 532 at 121-22 (cited in note 211) (same).
214 See note 210.
215 See Part I.C.
216 See Part I.B.1.

217 See note 14 and accompanying text.
218 See Miller, 588 F3d at 419-20 (concluding that trustees who will not heed a felon's instructions vis-i-vis his firearms have effectively removed the weapons from a defendant's "constructive possession").
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insights all courts have imbued into the firearm-disability
dilemma.219
CONCLUSION
Although no court has explicitly invoked a particular conception of property when ruling on the firearm-disability dilemma, the remedies handed down appear driven by substantive,
formalistic, and moralistic conceptualizations of property rights.
Substantive and formal conceptions of property encourage remedies that recognize residual firearm property rights. Moralistic
approaches, on the other hand, provide justifications for the
complete extinguishment of a felon's firearm property rights. An
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of each method
does not demonstrate an unambiguously preferred conceptualization of property in the context of the firearm-disability dilemma. But courts that utilize all three are in a position to benefit from the advantages that each view has to offer. This
Comment proposes that such an analysis may lead courts to employ the constructive trust and power-of-appointment remedy.
Recognition of the differing conceptualizations of property
that often motivate disparate remedies in property rights cases
is one tool courts and litigants can use to sort through precedential inconsistencies. As applied to the statutory contradiction
found at the intersection of §§ 922 and 924, these insights provide a considered approach to a novel property rights quandary,
thereby illuminating possible resolutions to the firearmdisability dilemma.

219 The Western District of Texas proposed a remedy similar to the constructive
trust and power-of-appointment solution in United States v Rodriguez, 2011 WL 5854369
(WD Tex). In that case, the court proposed designating a nonrelative of the defendant to
either hold the firearms in trust until the disability was removed or sell them for his account, which functionally approximates this Comment's solution. Id at *15.
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